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Abstract
Price limit trading rules are adopted in some stock markets (especially emerging markets) trying to cool
off traders’ short-term trading mania on individual stocks and increase market efficiency. Under such a
microstructure, stocks may hit their up-limits and down-limits from time to time. However, the behaviors
of price limit hits are not well studied partially due to the fact that main stock markets such as the US
markets and most European markets do not set price limits. Here, we perform detailed analyses of
the high-frequency data of all A-share common stocks traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2000 to 2011 to investigate the statistical properties of price limit hits
and the dynamical evolution of several important financial variables before stock price hits its limits.
We compare the properties of up-limit hits and down-limit hits. We also divide the whole period into
three bullish periods and three bearish periods to unveil possible differences during bullish and bearish
market states. To uncover the impacts of stock capitalization on price limit hits, we partition all stocks
into six portfolios according to their capitalizations on different trading days. We find that the price
limit trading rule has a cooling-off effect (object to the magnet effect), indicating that the rule takes
effect in the Chinese stock markets. We find that price continuation is much more likely to occur than
price reversal on the next trading day after a limit-hitting day, especially for down-limit hits, which has
potential practical values for market practitioners.
Introduction
In many stock markets, price limit rules are set expecting to reduce remarked swings by cooling off traders’
irrational mania. A stable stock market has lower risks and thus attracts more people to participate.
This is certainly increase the resource reallocation function of stock markets and benefits the economies.
2Price limit rules constrain intraday prices to move within a preset price interval embraced by a price up
limit and a price down limit. Usually, the limit prices are determined by fixed fluctuation percentages
in reference to the closing price of the previous day. In most stock markets, the fluctuation percentages
for up-limit and down-limit are symmetric. However, there are also examples for asymmetric price limits
especially in certain market states. After the price reaches its limit, a circuit breaker may be triggered
causing trading halt in some markets, while in other markets the traders can continue to trade shares [1].
The effectiveness of the price limit rules is controversial. It is expected to have a cooling-off effect to
reduce the volatility of stocks [2]. On the contrary, it may also cause a magnet effect, which refers to
the phenomenon that the price limit acts as a magnet to attract more trades leading to higher trading
intensity and price volatility and increases the probability of price rise or fall when the price is closer to
the limit price [1]. The magnet effect occurs when the traders fear of the lack of liquidity and possible
position lock caused by imminent price limit hits, and the traders are thus eager to protect themselves
through submitting aggressive sub-optimal orders, which usually induces large price variations and heavy
trading volumes. Since the cooling effect or the magnet effect takes place at the intraday level, studies of
the presence of either effect, the evolution of pre-hit dynamics and the performance of price limit rules are
of great interest to academics, investors and regulators to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms
of how the market structure and the investors’ trading behavior affects price discovery.
The study of price limits started on futures markets [3, 4]. Empirical analysis has been carried out
for different markets at different time periods. There is no consensus on the presence of a magnet effect
or a cooling-off effect. Arak and Cook investigated if price behavior is infected by price limits on the
treasury bond futures market and found no evidence of a magnet effect but rather a reversal effect [5].
Berkman and Steenbeek compared the price formation processes under different price limits between
Osaka Securities Exchange and Nikkei 225 index on the Singapore International Monetary Exchange
and found no significant arbitrage opportunities between the two markets [6]. In recent years, empirical
studies about the magnet effect concentrated on stock markets. Cho et al. studied the 5-min return time
series of 345 stocks traded on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1998/01/03 to 1999/03/20 and reported a
statistically and economically significant magnet effect for stock prices to accelerate towards the up-limit
and weak evidence of acceleration towards the down-limit [7]. Hsieh et al. analyzed the transaction data
of 439 stocks traded on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2000 using logit models and found evidence of the
magnet effect on both up-limt and down-limit [8]. Du et al. also observed the magnet effect when the
stock prices are approaching the price limits in the Korean market [9].
The Chinese stock markets also set price limits, which varied over time. The current ±10% price
limits were fixed since 1996/12/16 for A-share common stocks. There are several studies conducted
on the presence of the magnet or cooling-off effect. However, empirical results lead to controversial
conclusions [10–15]. According to the data released by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, by
June 2014, there are 2540 listed companies and the total market capitalization is about 24.412 trillion
Chinese Yuan. Due to its huge capitalization and representativeness as an emerging market, research on
Chinese stocks is of great importance and remarkable interest. In this work, we will perform detailed
analyses on the statistical properties of variables associated with price limit hits and the pre-hit dynamics
of important financial variables before limit hits in the Chinese stock markets. These issues are less studied
in previous works. To obtain conclusive results about the presence of a magnet or cooling-off effect in
the Chinese stock markets, one needs to adopt different methods proposed in the literature and consider
possible evolution of the effect (if present) per se. We leave this topic in a future work.
3Materials and Methods
The Chinese stock markets
There are two stock exchanges in mainland China. The first market for government approved securities
was founded in Shanghai on 1990/11/26 and started operation on 1990/12/19 under the name of the
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE). Shortly after, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) was established
on 1990/12/01, and started its operations on 1991/07/03. There are two separate markets for A-shares
and B-shares on both exchanges. A-shares are common stocks issued by mainland Chinese companies,
subscribed and traded in Chinese currency Renminbi (RMB), listed on mainland Chinese stock exchanges,
bought and sold by Chinese nationals and approved foreign investors. B-shares are issued by mainland
Chinese companies, traded in foreign currencies and listed on mainland Chinese stock exchanges. B-shares
carry a face value denominated in RMB. The B-share market was launched in 1992 and was restricted to
foreign investors before 2001/02/19. It has been open to Chinese investors since. The microstructure of
the two markets has been changed on several aspects, such as the daily price up/down limit rules imposed
since 1996/12/16. The price limits are ±10% for common stocks and ±5% for specially treated (ST and
ST*) stocks. We note that, before 1996/12/16, there were also periods with different intervals of price
limits or without price limits.
On each trading day, the trading time period is divided into three parts: opening call auction, cooling
periods, and continuous double auction. The market opens at 9:15 a.m. and enters the opening call
auction until 9:25 a.m, during which the trading system accepts order submissions and cancelations, and
all matched transactions are executed at 9:25 a.m. This is followed by a cooling period from 9:25 to 9:30
a.m. During the cooling period, the exchanges are open to order routing from members, but does not
accept the cancelation of orders. All matched orders are executed in real time. However, the information
is not released to trading terminals during the cooling period and is publicly available at the end of
the cooling period. The continuous double auction operates from 9:30 to 11:30 and from 13:00 to 15:00
(for SZSE, 14:57-15:00 is a closing call auction period to form the close price) and transaction occurs
automatically by matching due to price and time priority. The time interval between 11:30 a.m. and
13:00 p.m. is a trade halt period. Outside these opening hours, unexecuted orders will be removed by
the system.
Data sets
Our data sets were provided by RESSET (http://resset.cn/), which is a leading financial data provider
supporting academic research. The data sets contain all common A-share stocks traded on the Shanghai
Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The price limits for these stocks are ±10%. Specially
treated stocks with price limits of ±5% are not included in our analysis. The sample covers the period
from 2000/01/04 to 2011/12/30, totally 12 years. Because the stocks have different initial public offering
dates, the lengthes of stocks are not fixed. The quote frequency is about 5 seconds before 27 June
2011 and 3 seconds afterwards. Due to different liquidities of the stocks, the quote frequencies of different
stocks can be lower. For each stock, we have a unique stock code that is a sequence of six digital numbers,
the trading time, the trading price, the trading volume, and the prices and standing volumes at the three
best levels before 5 December 2003 or 5 levels afterwards on both the buy and sell sides of the limit order
book.
Determining daily price up/down limits
The records of stocks do not contain any indicator of price hits. Hence, we need to identify when the
price of a stock hits the up-limit or the low limit. Because the tick size of all stocks is one cent (0.01
Chinese Yuan), no matter they have high prices or low prices, we are able to identify price limit hits.
4Indeed, for each stock, we can determine the price up limit and price down limit for each trading day.
Let Pi(T ) denotes the closing price of stock i on day T . The up-limit P
+
i (T + 1) and the down-limit
P−i (T + 1) of stock i on day T + 1 are determined as follows,
P±i (T + 1) = R [100Pi(T )(1± 10%)]/100, (1)
where R [x] is a round operator of x such that the daily price limits are rounded to the tick size according
to the Trading Rules of Shanghai Stock Exchange (2003, 2006) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Trading
Rules (2003, 2006).
Determining bullish and bearish periods of the Chinese stock markets
A representative measure of the status of the Chinese stock markets is the Shanghai Stock Exchange
Composite (SSEC) Index. Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of the SSEC Index from 1999 to 2011. The
SSEC Index rose from 1406 on 2000/01/04 to its historical intraday high of 2242.4 on 2001/06/13 and
since plummeted 32.2% to 1520.7 on 2001/10/22. The Chinese stock markets entered a bearish antibubble
state since June of 2011 [16], which did not synchronize the U.S. antibubble after the burst of the so-
called New Economy Bubble in 2000 [17, 18]. The SSEC Index hit its all-time intraday low at 998.23
on 2005/06/04 during the time period investigated in this work. After that, A huge bubble formed and
the index reached its historical intraday high at 6124.04 on 2007/10/16, which was followed by a severe
crash [19] and the index plummeted to 1666.93 on 2008/10/28 as a all-time low since the crash. Although
the whole individual sentiment was bearish in the last six years, there was a mediate-size bubble started
after 2008/10/28 and the index reached 3478.01 on 2009/08/04. In summary, the time period under
investigation in this work can be divided into alternating periods of bullish and bearish states. The stock
market was bullish during the three time periods: 2000/1/4 - 2001/6/13, 2005/06/04 - 2007/10/16, and
2008/10/28 - 2009/08/04. Other periods are recognized as being bearish.
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Figure 1. Evolution of the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index from January 2000
to December 2011. The data shown are the closing prices. The historical highs and lows usually
occurred intraday. The index has been divided into alternating bullish and bearish periods. The red
parts stand for bullish periods and the green parts correspond to bearish periods.
In this work, we will compare the statistics of price limit hits in bullish and bearish market states. It
is true that individual stocks may evolve differently. However, it is hard to recognize bullish and bearish
states for individual stocks and it is not irrational to make such a comparison based on the SSEC Index.
We leave this more complicated stock-by-stock classification of bulls and bears in future research.
5Fitting procedure
The empirical distribution of the number of limit hits for individuals is truncated on the left. We find that
most of the distributions investigated in this work can be fitted by the left truncated normal distribution:
p(x) =
1√
2piσ
e
(x−µ)2
2σ2 , x > 0. (2)
Both ordinary least squares and maximum likelihood estimation are applied in curve fitting. When we
use maximum likelihood estimation to estimate parameters such as mean and variance, we cannot use the
sample mean and variance to substitute the whole population. A feasible method is the following [20]:{
E(X |X > 0) = µ+ σQ(µ/σ)
Q(r) = f(r)/F (r)
(3)
where f(·) and F (·) are respectively the density function and the cumulative density function of the
standard normal distribution. Denoting µ′ = E(X |X > 0) the mean of the truncated normal distribution,
one has {
µ′ = µ+ σQ(µ/σ)
Var(X |X > 0) = σ2{1−Q(µ/σ)[µ/σ +Q(µ/σ)]} (4)
Denoting σ′2 = Var(X |X > 0) the variance of the truncated normal distribution, one obtains
µ′/σ′ =
µ/σ +Q(µ/σ)√{1−Q(µ/σ)[µ/σ +Q(µ/σ)]} . (5)
Defining r = µ/σ, r′ = µ′/σ′, one gets
r′ =
[
r +
f(r)
F (r)
]
÷
√
1− f(r)
F (r)
[
r +
f(r)
F (r)
]
. (6)
In practical applications, we find that the function including r on the right side of Eq. (6) is mono-
tonically increasing. Hence the equation has a unique solution. We can determine r firstly, and then σ
and µ. Finally, we use σ and µ to estimate the population distribution.
Results
Basic statistics of the numbers of limit-hitting days
We provide statistical properties of the numbers of trading days with different types of limit hits. The
variables are the following. N is the total number of trading days with limit hits. 〈N〉 is the average
number of limit-hitting days for individual stocks. Ncon is the number of limit-hitting days with continued
next-day opening prices. It contains up (down) limit hitting days with the opening prices on next trading
days being higher (lower) than the closing prices. Nrev is the number of limit-hitting days with price
reversal on the next day. It contains up (down) limit hitting days with the opening prices on next
trading days being lower (larger) than the closing prices. Nopen, Nam, Npm and Nclose are respectively
the numbers of days with limit hits occurred in the opening call auction (9:15, 9:30], in the continuous
double auction session (9:30,11:30] in the morning, in the continuous double auction session [13:00, 15:00]
in the afternoon and at the closure of the trading days. Nclose,con and Nclose,rev are the numbers of trading
days that closed at limit prices and the price continued rising up or falling down on the successive trading
days. It is possible that for some stocks there are both up- and down-limit hits within the same day.
In this case, the first limit hit is used in the calculation of different numbers. We further delete IPO
6days and ex-dividend days. Since trading halt may trigger after a price limit-hitting day and thus there
is no followup open price, we do not count these days in Ncon, Nrev, Nclose,con, and Nclose,rev. We also
partition evenly all stocks with limit hits on a given day into six portfolios based on their capitalizations
(Portfolio 1 with the smallest capitalizations and Portfolio 6 with the largest capitalizations) and count
the defined numbers for each portfolio. The numbers are determined for the whole period, and the bullish
and bearish periods as well. The capitalization of a stock is calculated as the product of the amount of
shares times the price. The basic statistics of limit hits in the whole sample period and in bullish and
bearish periods are presented in Table 1. It is trivial to observe that
N± =
6∑
j=1
N±,j and N±,i ≈ N±,j , (7)
where the subscripts + and − represent respectively price up limit hit and price down limit hit, and j
stands for the portfolio serial number.
Panel A of Table 1 shows the results for the whole period from 2000 to 2011. There are more limit-up
hits than limit-down hits, which is partially caused by the rapid growth of China’s economy and the
absence of short mechanism. The limit-down days are more likely to have next-day price continuation
than limit-up days since N+con/N
+ = 39696/62346 = 63.7% and N−con/N
− = 33601/44216 = 75.9%. In
addition, a limit hitting day is more likely to have price continuation than price reversal because N±con ≫
N±rev. For all other numbers concerning all stocks and different portfolios, we also observe more limit-up
days than limit-down days. For limit-down days, the probability of next-day price continuation decreases
with increasing average capitalization of the portfolio, while the probability of next-day price reversal
increases with the capitalization. For limit-up days, the probabilities of next-day price continuation
and price reversal do no have any clear trend. For N±open and N
±
am, we observe decreasing trends with
capitalization. For N±pm, we observe increasing trends with capitalization. For N
±
close, they increase first
and then decrease. In all the seven cases (all stocks and the six portfolios), limit-up events are more likely
to occur in the morning than in the afternoon, while limit-down events are more likely to happen in the
afternoon than in the morning. Limit-up events have higher probability (65.3%) to close at limit price
than limit-down events (51.0%) according to Nclose. When a trading day closes at the up-limit or the
down-limit, the next-day opening price will rise with a very high probability (79.4% for limit-up events
and 85.8% for limit-down events). In addition, N±close,con and N
±
close,rev increase first and then decrease.
For the bullish periods in Panel B of Table 1, in all seven cases (all stocks and the six portfolios),
there are more limit-up days for N , Nopen, Nam and Nclose. For the bullish periods in Panel C of Table
1, there are more limit-up days than limit-down days for N , Nopen, Nam, and Nclose, with an exception
that there are more limit-down days than limit-up days in the afternoon (N−pm > N
+
pm). However, the
occurrence difference between limit-up and limit-down days is smaller in the bearish periods than in the
bullish periods. For bullish periods in Panel B, N+open and N
+
am decrease with increasing capitalization,
N+pm increases with capitalization, and no evident trends have been found in N
−
open, N
−
am, N
−
pm and N
±
close.
For bearish periods in Panel C, N±open and N
±
am decrease with capitalization, N
+
pm and N
−
pm increase with
capitalization, and N+close and N
−
close do not exhibit any clear trend with respect to capitalization.
For both bullish and bearish periods, price continuation is more likely to occur than price rever-
sal for both limit-up and limit-down days, because N±con > N
±
rev and N
±
close,con > N
±
close,rev. In addi-
tion, the probability of price continuation is higher for limit-down days than for limit-up days, that is
N+con/N
+ < N−con/N
− and N+close,con/N
+
close < N
−
close,con/N
−
close. For bullish periods, the probability of
price continuation increases with capitalization for limit-up days (N+con/N
+) and decreases with capi-
talization for limit-down days (N−con/N
−). These trends are absent for N±close. For bearish period, we
observe that N−con/N
−, N+close,con/N
+
close and N
−
close,con/N
−
close all have a decreasing trend with respect to
the capitalization.
These findings have potential applications for practitioners in the Chinese stock markets, keeping in
mind that one cannot short and there is a T +1 trading rule. When the price of a stock hits the up-limit,
7no matter in the intraday or at the close, she can buy right before market closure at 15:00 and sell with
the opening price on the next trading day. Regardless of the transaction cost, the return will have high
probability to be positive. The probability of earning money is even high if the price is locked to the
up-limit and when the capitalization of the stock is low. Certainly, in this case, the liquidity is usually
very low and it is hard to buy shares. On the contrary, if one holds a stock whose price experiences
intraday down-limit hits, it is better to sell it to reduce losses.
Advanced statistics of intraday limit hits
For each stock i traded in Ti days in our sample, we identify Ki trading days on which the prices have hit
either the up-limit or the down-limit at least once. We denote the set of limit-up days (trading days that
have up-limit hits) of stock i asUi = {ui,k : k = 1, 2, · · · ,Kui }, whereKui = #Ui is the number of limit-up
trading days. Similarly, the set of limit-down days of stock i is denoted as Di = {di,k : k = 1, 2, · · · ,Kdi },
where Kdi = #Di is the number of limit-down trading days. The intersection of Ui and Di is not
necessary to be empty, because, although very rare, it is possible that stock i hits its up-limit and down-
limit on the same day. In other words, Ki ≤ Kui +Kdi . The percents of limit-hitting days are calculated
as follows
n˜i =
Ki
Ti
, n˜ui =
Kui
Ti
, and n˜di =
Kdi
Ti
, (8)
where n˜i, n˜
u
i and n˜
d
i can be regarded as the empirical probabilities that stock i will hit either the upper
or the down-limit, the up-limit, and the down-limit on a trading day, respectively.
Figure 2 shows the empirical distributions of limit-hitting probability per day for individual stocks.
As shown in Fig. 2(a), for most of the stocks, the daily limit-hitting probability is less than 6%, with the
most probability value around 2.5%. However, there are also a few stocks having very large limit-hitting
probability up to 17%. Such seemingly outliers include 002606, 002632, 002635, 002643, 002644, and
002646. These stocks have relatively large numbers of price down limit hits, as shown in Fig. 2(c). The
large values of n˜di are mainly caused by the small values of Ti because these stocks come into the market
for a short time period. For most stocks, the daily up-limit hit is less than 4% according to Fig. 2(b)
and the daily dow-limit hit is less than 3% according to Fig. 2(c). This finding is consistent with the
observation that N+ > N− in Table 1. It seems that the curves obtained by the OLS method fit the
empirical data better than those by the MLE method.
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Figure 2. Empirical probability density functions P (n˜i), P (n˜
u
i ) and P (n˜
d
i ) of daily price
limit hitting probabilities n˜i, n˜
u
i and n˜
d
i for individual stocks. The dots are empirical data, the
black dash-dotted curves are the MLE fits to the truncated normal distribution in Eq. (2), and the
black dash-dotted curves are the OLS fits to the truncated normal distribution. (a) All limit hits; (b)
Price up limit hits; (c) Price down limit hits.
Consider a limit-hitting day ui,k (or di,k) of stock i. The price may hit the price limit for M
u
i,k (or
8Mdi,k ) times at intraday moments t
u
i,k,m (or t
d
i,k,m) with m = 1, · · · ,Mui,k (orMdi,k). We define the average
number of limit hits of stock i as follows,
Mui =
1
Kui
Kui∑
k=1
Mui,k and M
d
i =
1
Kdi
Kdi∑
k=1
Mdi,k. (9)
where the denominators are not the total number of trading days, Ti, but the number of price up limit
hitting days and of price down limit hitting days.
According to Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b), the distributions ofMui,k and M
d
i,k decrease sharply. About 30%
of limit-hitting days have only one up-limit hit or down-limit hit. However, there are also limit-hitting
days with very large numbers of limit hits in one day. For instance, stock 600863 hit the up-limit for
151 times on 2009/07/14, while stock 600102 hit the down-limit for 149 times on 2009/04/27, which
has been delisted from the Shanghai Stock Exchange due to it poor performance. Surprisingly, the two
distributions P (Mui ) and P (M
d
i ) are not monotonically decreasing functions. Instead, they can be well
fitted by the truncated normal distribution. Speaking differently, if the price limit (10% or -10%) of a
stock has been reached on certain trading day, the number of limit hits on that day is usually more than
once.
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Figure 3. Number of limit hits on individual limit-hitting days. (a,b) Probability density
functions P (Mui,k) and P (M
d
i,k) of M
u
i,k and M
d
i,k. (c,d) Probability density functions P (M
u
i ) and
P (Mdi ) of M
u
i and M
d
i for individual stocks.
When stock i hits its price limit on day ui,k (or di,k), the m-th limit-up (or limit-down) started at
tui,k,m (or t
d
i,k,m) may be opened at t
u
i,k,m + ∆t
u
i,k,m (or t
d
i,k,m + ∆t
d
i,k,m). Hence, we have a sequence of
limit-hitting durations ∆tui,k,m (or ∆t
d
i,k,m). The total duration on that day can be calculated as follows:
∆tui,k =
Mui,k∑
m=1
∆tui,k,m and ∆t
d
i,k =
Mdi,k∑
m=1
∆tdi,k,m. (10)
9Considering only the limit-hitting days of stock i, we can also define the average limit hit duration as
follows:
∆tui =
1
Kui
Kui∑
k=1
Mui,k∑
m=1
∆tui,k,m and ∆t
d
i =
1
Kdi
Kdi∑
k=1
Mdi,k∑
m=1
∆tdi,k,m. (11)
We stress that these two quantities are defined for individual stocks and the denominators are not Ti.
Plots (a) and (d) of Fig. 4 show the empirical distributions of the durations ∆tui,k,m and ∆t
d
i,k,m of
individual limit hits for all stocks. The two distributions exhibit a similar “L” shape. In each distribution,
there are three obvious peaks at ∆tu,di,k,m = 7200s, 10800s and 12600s, which correspond respectively to
2 hours, 3 hours and 3.5 hours. These peaks are mainly caused by limit hits at 13:00 p.m., 10:30 a.m.
and 10:00 a.m. with the prices remaining at the limit prices till market closure. These patterns contain
significant information contents. The peak around 13:00 reflects the fact that the majority of the traders
or some informed traders may obtain cumulated important information about the holding stock during
the market closure at noon (11:30-13:00) and form a collective behavior to buy or sell their stock to push
the price to its limit. This interpretation applies certainly to the peak at 14400s, corresponding to the
case that the stock opens at its limit price due to overnight information and does not fluctuate during the
whole trading day. The peak at 10800s are caused by the one-hour opening trading halts in which the
stock usually bears abnormal information pit and traders’ trading habits and round number preference.
The peak at 12600s is less significant, which is very likely caused by traders’ trading habits and round
number preference.
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Figure 4. Limit hit duration. (a,d) Probability density functions P (∆tui,k,m) and P (∆t
d
i,k,m) of the
individual limit hit durations ∆tui,k,m and ∆t
d
i,k,m. (b,e) Probability density functions P (∆t
u
i,k) and
P (∆tdi,k) of the daily limit hit durations ∆t
u
i,k and ∆t
d
i,k. (c,f) Probability density functions P (∆t
u
i ) and
P (∆tdi ) of the average daily limit hit durations ∆t
u
i and ∆t
d
i . The unit of the variables is second.
Plots (b) and (e) of Fig. 4 show the empirical distributions of the daily limit hit durations ∆tui,k and
∆tdi,k. The overall shapes of these two distributions are very similar with those in Fig. 4 (a) and (d).
The main differences are that the distributions of daily limit hit durations have lower heights at the two
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edges and larger values in the bold parts. Plots (c) and (f) of Fig. 4 present the empirical distributions
of the average daily durations ∆tui and ∆t
d
i for individual stocks. The distributions are bimodal with an
extra peak close to ∆tu,di = 0s.
We further define the total intraday limit hit duration on trading day uk, which is the time elapse
from the moment of the first limit hit to the last moment that prices stay at limit in a limit-hitting day:
∆T ui,k = t
u
i,k,Mu
i,k
+∆tui,k,Mu
i,k
− tui,k,1 and ∆T di,k = tdi,k,Md
i,k
+∆td
i,k,Md
i,k
− tdi,k,1. (12)
By definition, we have ∆T u,di,k ≥ ∆tu,di,k . We also define the average of the total intraday limit-hitting
duration for individual stocks as follows,
∆T ui =
1
Kui
Kui∑
k=1
∆T ui,k and ∆T
d
i =
1
Kdi
Kdi∑
k=1
∆T di,k. (13)
Similarly, we have ∆T u,di ≥ ∆tu,di .
The upper panel of Fig. 5 shows the empirical distributions of the total intraday limit hit durations
∆T ui,k and ∆T
d
i,k for all stocks. The distribution in Fig. 5(a) has two local maxima around ∆T
u
i,k = 7200s
and 10800s as in Fig. 4(b) for ∆tui,k. The distribution in Fig. 5(b) has a similar overall shape. However,
it is less smoother. The lower panel of Fig. 5 shows the empirical distributions of ∆T ui and ∆T
d
i . It is
hard to find a suitable function form to fit the data.
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Figure 5. Total intraday limit hit duration. (a,b) Probability density functions P (∆T ui,k) and
P (∆T di,k) of the total intraday limit hit durations ∆T
u
i,k and ∆T
d
i,k. (c,d) Probability density functions
P (∆T ui ) and P (∆T
d
i ) of the averages of total intraday limit hit durations ∆T
u
i and ∆T
d
i . The unit of
the variables is second.
As a complementary to the distributions in Fig. 3 to Fig. 5, we investigate the maxima, the medians
and the means of the three kinds of daily variables, the daily numbers of limit hits Mu,di,k , the daily
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limit hit durations ∆tu,di,k and the total intraday limit hit durations ∆T
u,d
i,k . We compare the results for
the whole time period, the bullish periods and the bearish periods. We also divide all the stocks into
six portfolios as defined in Table 1 to investigate the impacts of stock capitalization. The results are
presented in Table 2.
For the maximal number of limit hits, we find that max{Mui,k} > max{Mdi,k} for all cases, except for
Portfolio 2 in bullish periods. However, for the means, we have mean{Mui,k} < mean{Mdi,k} in all the
cases. On average, down-limit hits are less stable than up-limit hits, indicating that the fear sentiment
of traders fluctuates more than the greed sentiments in the Chinese stock markets. Similarly, we observe
that med{Mui,k} < med{Mdi,k} in all the cases. However, the difference med{Mdi,k}−med{Mui,k} is larger
in the bearish periods than in the bullish periods. It indicates that the fighting between long positions
and short positions is more severe when the price hits the down-limit than the up-limit, because trades
can make profits when the market rises up while they can only deduce losses when the market falls down.
No clear correlation is found between mean{Mu,di,k } and capitalization in the bullish periods. In contrast,
both mean{Mui,k} and mean{Mdi,k} are positively correlated with capitalization in the bearish periods.
For the other variables, we find that the quantities for up-limits are greater than their counterparts
for down-limits. Specifically, we observe that mean{∆tui,k} > mean{∆tdi,k}, med{∆tui,k} > med{∆tdi,k},
mean{∆T ui,k} > mean{∆T di,k}, and med{∆T ui,k} > med{∆T di,k} for different periods and different portfo-
lios. Together with the results for mean{Mu,di,k } , we find that the average duration of individual up-limit
hits is about twice longer than that of individual down-limit hits. This is probably caused by the no-short
trading rule because traders can make money only when the market rises. There are also traders known
as “dare-to-die corps for up-limit hits”, who are actively engaged in pushing prices to the up-limits. It
is also found that these quantities have a bell-like shape or monotonically decrease with respect to the
capitalization.
Intraday patterns of the occurrence of price limit hits
We divide the continuous double auction period in each trading day into N intervals of equal length of
∆t minutes. If an interval starts at t0 and ends at t1 = t0 +∆t, we can count the number of occurrences
of up-limit hits in this interval as
Cui =
Kui∑
k=1
Itu
i,k
∈(t0,t1], (14)
and similarly the number of occurrences of down-limit hits
Cdi =
Kdi∑
k=1
Itd
i,k
∈(t0,t1], (15)
where Ix is an indicator function of event such that the value of Ix is 1 if the event x is true and 0
otherwise. We can further calculate the following quantities
Cu,d =
I∑
i=1
Cu,di , (16)
where I is the number of stocks in the investigated sample.
The intraday patterns of the occurrence of limit hits in intervals of size ∆t = 5 min are illustrated
in Fig. 6. For each intraday interval, we have Cu,d = Cu,dbull + C
u,d
bear. The occurrence of up-limit hits is
extremely high at the opening of the market around 9:30 a.m., while the occurrence of down-limits is
relatively high at the opening. There are also other local peaks around 09:30, 09:45, 10:00, 10:30, 11:30,
13:30, 14:30 and 14:45. Up-limit hits have different intraday patterns from down-limit hits. However, the
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intraday patterns do not differ much when comparing the bullish periods with the bearish periods. In all
the six cases, limit hits are more frequent in the last hour, especially for down-limit hits. For up-limits,
the occurrence number is quite stable over the period from 10:30 a.m. to 14:20 p.m., except for the
afternoon opening of the market.
Figure 6. Intraday patterns of the occurrence of limit hits. The three columns of plots
correspond respectively to the whole period (a,d), the bullish periods (b,e) and the bearish periods
(c,f). The time interval ∆t is 5 min.
Dynamics of financial variables before limit hits
Limit hits are rare events. The dynamics of financial variables before limits can enrich our understanding
of trading activities of investors around such extreme events. We investigate here the evolution of several
important financial variables before stock prices hit the up-limits and down-limits. Limit hits occurred at
the opening of the market are excluded from analysis, because one cannot trace the pre-event dynamics
of any financial variables.
We first study the average velocity of price change for all limit-hitting events in isometric intervals of
price changes during bullish periods and bearish periods. For each limit-hitting event i, we consider the
cases when the price rises above 5% or falls below -5%, compared with the close price of the previous
trading day. We divide each of the two intervals (5%, 10%] and [−10%,−5%) into 10 subintervals ((5 +
0.5m)%, (5.5+0.5m)%] and [−(5.5+0.5m)%,−(5+0.5m)%), where m = 0, 1, 2, · · · , 9. Let ∆tim denotes
the time duration for the stock price rising from (5 + 0.5m)% to (5.5 + 0.5m)%] or dropping from
−(5+0.5m)% to −(5.5+0.5m)%]. We consider four classes of limit hits: up-limit hits in bullish periods,
up-limit hits in bearish periods, down-limit hits in bullish periods, and down-limit hits in bearish periods.
For each class of limit hits, we define the dimensionless velocity of price change as follow,
Vm =
1
1
N
N∑
i=1
∆tim
9∑
m=0
∆tim
, m = 0, 1, 2, · · · , 9 (17)
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where N is the number of limit hits of the class under investigation. If ∆tim is independent of m for
all i, the velocity is constant such that Vm = 9. If the average 〈∆tim〉 over i increases (decreases) with
m, Vm decreases (increases) when the price approaches the price limit, showing evidence of a cooling off
(magnet) effect.
As shown in Fig. 7, when stock price approaches the limit price, the price movement velocity decreases,
except that the velocity does not change much when the price rise is less than 9% for up-limit hits in the
bullish periods. It suggests that there exists cooling-off effects when stock price gets close to the limit
price. In this sense, the price limit rule is effective in the Chinese stock markets. The cooling-off effect
is more remarkable in bearish periods than in bullish periods before up-limit hits and down-limit hits.
However, the effectiveness of the cooling-off effect is mixed between up-limit hits and down-limit hits.
The asymmetry of the cooling-off effect between bullish and bearish periods is probably caused by the
no-short trading rule and the special lift forces in the bullish periods, such as the “dare-to-die corps for
up-limit hits”.
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Figure 7. Cooling-off effect of the price limit rule. (a) Comparison of price movement velocity
V um before up-limit hits in the bullish and bearish periods. (b) Comparison of price movement velocity
V dm before down-limit hits in the bullish and bearish periods.
We now study the evolution of another four financial measures associated with the last 100 trades
till hitting the price limits. We first investigate the evolution of sizes of buyer-initiated trades and seller-
initiated trades on the last 100 trades including the one pushing the price to its limit. The last trade
causes the price to hit its limit, labelled as the 100th trade. If the k-th trade was initiated by a buyer
before an up-limit hit i or by a seller before a down-limit hit i, we denote s+i (k) as its size and, in this
case, s−i (k) = 0. Alternatively, if the k-th trade was initiated by a seller before an up-limit hit i or by
a buyer before a down-limit hit i, we denote s−i (k) as its size and s
+
i (k) = 0. Hence, s
+
i (k) and s
−
i (k)
are respectively the sizes of same-direction (momentum) and opposite-direction (contrarian) trades that
move the price towards and away from the limit price. We compare up-limit hits and down-limit hits.
We also consider separately bullish periods and bearish periods. The average logarithmic trade sizes of
the last 100 transactions are calculated as follows,
s±(k) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ln
[
s±i (k)
]
, (18)
where N is the number of limit hits in one of the four cases (up-limit in bullish periods, down-limit in
bullish periods, up-limit in bearish periods, and down-limit in bearish periods). Since the last trade is
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by definition the same-direction trade that push the price to the limit, we have s−i (100) ≡ 0 in all cases.
For simplicity, we use the notation s−(100) = 0 instead of s−(100) = −∞ in the following.
Figure 8(a) illustrates the evolution of the same-direction trade sizes s+(k) and the opposite-direction
trade sizes s−(k) for different cases. The same-direction trade sizes s+(k) have similar evolutionary
trajectories in all the four cases, so do the opposite-direction trade sizes s−(k). We find that s+(k)
increases from k = 1 to reach the local maximum at k = 96 and then decreases till k = 99 followed
by a very large s+(100) pushing the price to the limit, while s−(k) decreases from k = 1 to reach the
local minimum at k = 96 and then increases till k = 99, ended with s−(100) = 0. For all k, we have
s+(k) > s−(k), indicating that the pushing force of the same-direction traders is stronger than that of
the opposite-direction traders. The trade size difference s+(k)−s−(k) continuously increases and reaches
its local maxima at k = 96 and then decreases till k = 99. These findings also provide clues about the
cooling down of the last three trades right before limit hits. The trade sizes s+(k) are larger when the
price is close to the up-limit than to the down-limit, which is true for both bullish and bearish periods.
The trade sizes s+(k) for the case of down-limit hits in bearish periods are relatively the lowest. The
relative position of the four s+(k) curves provides evidence of a well-known trait of Chinese traders that
they tend to buy rising stocks and hate to sell holding shares when the stock price drops.
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Figure 8. Evolution of four important financial quantities along the last 100 trades right
before limit hits. (a) Evolution of the logarithmic same-direction trade sizes s+(k) (the upper
bundle) and the logarithmic opposite-direction trade sizes s−(k) (the lower bundle) for up-limit hits and
down-limit hits in the bullish periods and bearish periods. (b) Evolution of the average trade-by-trade
return R(k). (c) Evolution of the average trade-by-trade volatility v(K). (d) Evolution of the average
bid-ask spread right before individual trades. For each financial quantity, we consider four cases, that is,
up-limit hits in bullish periods, down-limit hits in bullish periods, up-limit hits in bearish periods, and
down-limit hits in bearish periods.
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As shown in Fig. 8(a), the average size s+(100) of the last trade that pushed the price to hit the
limit is extraordinary larger than the size of any preceding trades. We show the empirical distributions
of s+(100) for the four cases. All the distributions are unimodal and have similar shapes. However, they
have different peak heights. The peak is the highest for the case of up-limit hits in the bullish periods,
the second largest for the case of up-limit hits in the bearish periods.
We denote pi(k) the transaction price of the k-th trade before the i-th limit hit,
{
pai,j(k)|j = 1, · · · , J
}
and
{
V ai,j(k)|j = 1, · · · , J
}
the prices and standing volumes at the first J price levels of the sell-side limit
order book right before the k-th trade, and
{
pbi,j(k)|j = 1, · · · , J
}
and
{
V bi,j(k)|j = 1, · · · , J
}
the prices
and standing volumes on the first J price levels of the buy-side limit order book right before the k-th
trade. The second financial variable investigated is the average trade-by-trade return which is defined as
follows,
R(k) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ln pi(k)− ln pi(k − 1), k = 1, 2, 3, · · · , 100. (19)
Figure 8(b) shows the evolution of average trade-by-trade return R(k) before price limit hits. It is found
that R(k) increases superlinearly before k close to 100 and then decreases sharply before up-limit hits in
both bullish and bearish periods. Almost symmetrically, R(k) decreases superlinearly before k close to
100 and then increases sharply before down-limit hits in both bullish and bearish periods. These patterns
are consistent with the behaviors of the average trade sizes, because large trade sizes usually cause large
price movements [21–24].
The third variable is the average trade-by-trade volatility which is defined as follows,
v(k) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
| ln pi(k)− ln pi(k − 1)|, k = 1, 2, 3, · · · , 100. (20)
Figure 8(c) presents the evolution of average trade-by-trade volatility v(k) before price limit hits. The
volatility v(k) before up-limit hits for both bullish and bearish periods is relatively stable when k is less
than about 50, then increases rapidly to reach a maximum one or two trades before limit hits, and finally
drops to some extent. About five trades before up-limit hits, the volatility is higher during bullish periods
than in bearish periods. The volatility about 70 trades before down-limit hits is higher than that before
up-limit hits and exhibits a mild decreasing trend. The volatility increases afterwards and decreases again
around k = 95.
The fourth variable investigated is the average bid-ask spread right before the k-th trade which is
defined as follows,
S(k) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
pai,1(k)− pbi,1(k)
1
2
[
pai,1(k) + p
b
i,1(k)
] , k = 1, 2, 3, · · · , 100. (21)
As illustrated in Fig. 8(d), the four curves of the average bid-ask spread S(k) decrease before k ≈ 60. The
two spread curves for the bullish periods have very similar shapes. After the initial decrease, they increase
during the next twenty trades or so and decrease again before the limit hits. For the curve associated
with up-limit hits in bearish periods, the spread increases continuously after k ≈ 75. The comparison
of the four curves is also quite intriguing. The spread before up-limit hits is narrower than that before
down-limit hits, indicating higher liquidity before up-limit hits. On average, the spread is the narrowest
before up-limit hits in bearish periods and the widest before down-limit hits in bearish periods.
Discussion
Stock markets are complex systems in which humans interact by buying and selling shares. The evolu-
tionary trajectories of stock markets are fully determined by the behaviors of human being. It is widely
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accepted that people in emerging markets are less skilled and more irrational and thus these markets are
much riskier. Due to different factors such as imitation, global news, as well as collusive manipulation,
traders may herd to push the price rise up or drop down rapidly in very short time intervals through
positive feedback loops. Such kind of collective behaviors might be caused partially by the somewhat
reciprocity among a small amount of traders through price manipulation, which is reminiscent of the
cooperation phenomena among human beings [25–28].
To cool off traders’ intraday mania to avoid the price deviating much from its fundamental value, a
number of stock exchanges pose price limit rules. Empirical evidence is controversial about the presence
of a magnet effect or a cooling off effect even for the Chinese stock markets [15]. Our preliminary result
on the price movement velocity favors the presence of an intraday cooling-off effect for both up-limits and
down-limits in both bullish and bearish periods. The evolution of other financial variables such as trade
size, trade-by-trade return, trade-by-trade volatility and bid-ask spread seems to support the conclusion
that the traders are cooled off right before stock prices hit the price limits, as shown by the anti-trend
behavior just before hitting the price limits. It is well documented that the limit order books are thin
near price limits [29] and thus the liquidity is worse. When the price is pushed towards its limit, traders
submit larger and larger orders and the price changes enlarge. However, the population of traders who
place opposite orders to realize their gains or act as bottom fishers also increases. When the price is close
to its limit, the force of opposite traders reverses the trends. In this sense, the price limit rule works in
the Chinese stock markets.
We have investigated the statistical properties of characteristic variables of up-limit and down-limit
hits in bullish and bearish periods. We also uncovered nonlinear impacts of stock capitalization on price
limit hits by comparing six portfolios sorted due to stocks’ capitalization on the daily level. It is intriguing
to find that price continuation occurs more frequently than price reversal on the next trading day after a
limit-hitting day. This effect is more significant for down-limit hits. The empirical probability of next-day
price continuation is thus far greater than 50%. Our empirical findings have potential practical values
for market practitioners. For instance, it will be probably profitable to buy shares at the close price in a
up-limit hitting day and sell the share at the opening of the next trading day, or to sell the shares one
holds in a down-limit hitting day.
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Table 1. Summary statistics of limit hits in the whole period (Panel A), in the bullish
periods (Panel B), and in the bearish periods (Panel C). N is the total number of trading days
with limit hits. 〈N〉 is the average number of limit-hitting days for individual stocks. Ncon is the
number of limit-hitting days with continued next-day opening prices (up-limit days with the next-day
opening prices higher than the closing prices and down-limit days with the next-day opening price lower
than the closing prices). Nrev is the number of limit-hitting days with price reversal on the next day.
Nopen, Nam, Npm and Nclose are respectively the numbers of days with limit hits occurred in the opening
call auction, in the continuous double auction in the morning, in the continuous double auction in the
afternoon and at the closure of the trading days. Nclose,con and Nclose,rev are the numbers of trading
days that closed at limit prices and the price continued rising or falling on the successive trading days.
Panel A: Whole sample period
All stocks Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 Portfolio 5 Portfolio 6
Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down
N 62346 44216 10393 7369 10393 7369 10390 7368 10389 7368 10387 7368 10394 7374
〈N〉 20.58 14.60 3.43 2.43 3.43 2.43 3.43 2.43 3.43 2.43 3.43 2.43 3.43 2.43
Ncon 39696 33601 6595 6242 6819 5706 6662 5569 6538 5514 6443 5324 6639 5246
Nrev 22627 10603 3798 1127 3574 1662 3724 1798 3848 1852 3937 2040 3746 2124
Nopen 6718 2126 1444 441 1445 332 1115 334 898 347 886 316 930 356
Nam 33204 15694 5740 3082 5831 2460 5673 2551 5522 2674 5434 2496 5004 2431
Npm 29157 28525 4653 4287 4562 4909 4720 4818 4871 4695 4959 4873 5392 4943
Nclose 40752 22213 6207 3203 6948 3745 7137 3882 7004 3857 6871 3791 6585 3735
Nclose,con 32340 19067 5120 2986 5610 3252 5612 3316 5480 3278 5321 3147 5197 3088
Nclose,rev 8394 3138 1087 217 1338 493 1521 566 1522 577 1544 641 1382 644
Panel B: Bull period
All stocks Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 Portfolio 5 Portfolio 6
Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down
N 32593 17898 5432 2983 5432 2983 5432 2983 5432 2983 5431 2983 5434 2983
〈N〉 26.52 14.56 4.42 2.43 4.42 2.43 4.42 2.43 4.42 2.43 4.42 2.43 4.42 2.43
Ncon 22344 13888 3501 2563 3713 2397 3690 2315 3787 2278 3775 2190 3878 2145
Nrev 10249 4010 1931 420 1719 586 1742 668 1645 705 1656 793 1556 838
Nopen 2908 986 660 161 508 134 421 175 432 183 440 162 447 171
Nam 15785 6730 2925 1117 2657 1005 2650 1168 2626 1191 2590 1173 2337 1076
Npm 16809 11168 2507 1866 2775 1978 2782 1815 2806 1792 2842 1810 3097 1907
Nclose 20814 8778 3035 1278 3511 1480 3644 1559 3652 1540 3577 1493 3395 1428
Nclose,con 17394 8011 2541 1195 2923 1371 2977 1407 3062 1406 2986 1352 2905 1280
Nclose,rev 3420 767 494 83 588 109 667 152 590 134 591 141 490 148
Panel C: Bear period
All stocks Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 Portfolio 5 Portfolio 6
Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down
N 29753 26318 4961 4386 4960 4386 4956 4385 4957 4385 4958 4385 4961 4391
〈N〉 16.53 14.62 2.76 2.44 2.76 2.44 2.75 2.44 2.75 2.44 2.75 2.44 2.76 2.44
Ncon 17352 19713 3062 3678 3034 3299 2810 3247 2785 3231 2824 3162 2837 3096
Nrev 12378 6593 1899 708 1926 1086 2141 1137 2167 1152 2130 1219 2115 1291
Nopen 3810 1140 935 282 931 189 600 155 437 165 409 163 498 186
Nam 17419 8964 3004 1960 3231 1434 2984 1404 2843 1445 2747 1365 2610 1356
Npm 12348 17357 1957 2426 1730 2952 1977 2982 2118 2941 2214 3021 2352 3035
Nclose 19938 13435 3244 1924 3424 2261 3432 2324 3344 2322 3333 2311 3161 2293
Nclose,con 14946 11056 2621 1788 2644 1871 2502 1900 2423 1857 2435 1824 2321 1816
Nclose,rev 4974 2371 623 136 780 390 925 424 917 463 895 484 834 474
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Table 2. Statistics of intraday limit hits for individual stocks. The determination of the six
portfolios is the same as in Table 1. The maxima, the mediates and the means of the daily numbers of
limit hits Mu,di,k , the daily limit hit durations ∆t
u,d
i,k and the total intraday limit hit durations ∆T
u,d
i,k are
presented. Results for bullish periods and bearish periods are compared.
Panel A: Whole sample period
All stocks Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 Portfolio 5 Portfolio 6
Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down
max{Mu,di,k } 151 149 88 87 114 102 113 96 125 119 133 99 151 149
mean{Mu,di,k } 7.47 8.27 5.74 6.67 7.13 7.86 7.70 8.62 7.95 8.55 8.06 8.83 8.23 9.09
med{Mu,di,k } 4 5 3 4 4 5 4 6 4 6 4 6 4 6
mean{∆tu,di,k } 4391 2189 4285 2014 4723 2036 4696 2291 4542 2347 4300 2247 3801 2202
med{∆tu,di,k } 2096 815 1720 552 2386 745 2397 906 2282 911 2113 866 1815 917
mean{∆T u,di } 5740 3888 5553 3793 6241 3661 6059 4035 5822 4054 5590 3924 5175 3857
med{∆T u,di } 4118 1937 3496 1785 5020 1796 4740 2035 4324 2077 4004 1953 3408 1982
Panel B: Bull period
All stocks Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 Portfolio 5 Portfolio 6
Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down
max{Mu,di,k } 151 149 88 87 97 102 114 96 113 72 125 97 151 149
mean{Mu,di,k } 7.34 7.76 6.42 7.16 7.19 7.67 7.71 8.18 7.64 7.83 7.46 7.90 7.61 7.83
med{Mu,di,k } 4 5 3 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5
mean{∆tu,di,k } 4064 2403 3956 1757 4276 1991 4327 2643 4288 2858 4011 2719 3525 2452
med{∆tu,di,k } 1778 790 1290 408 1901 603 2070 956 2093 1064 1850 1016 1580 965
mean{∆T u,di } 5251 4011 5123 3566 5410 3521 5524 4307 5493 4388 5225 4286 4736 3997
med{∆T u,di } 3415 2018 2689 1539 3675 1605 3982 2187 3877 2264 3495 2213 2853 2089
Panel C: Bear period
All stocks Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio 4 Portfolio 5 Portfolio 6
Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down
max{Mu,di,k } 133 125 65 59 88 71 108 73 133 119 131 99 124 125
mean{Mu,di,k } 7.61 8.62 4.84 6.30 7.23 8.02 7.96 8.99 8.28 9.05 8.55 9.58 8.81 9.78
med{Mu,di,k } 3 6 2 4 4 6 4 6 4 6 4 7 4 7
mean{∆tu,di,k } 4750 2044 4912 2193 5227 2042 5065 2013 4764 1988 4468 1979 4064 2049
med{∆tu,di,k } 2520 829 2848 707 3093 878 2640 855 2541 817 2305 819 2043 885
mean{∆T u,di } 6275 3804 6460 3950 7179 3717 6470 3830 6104 3825 5838 3753 5597 3747
med{∆T u,di } 5030 1871 5509 1919 7172 1917 5480 1869 4905 1814 4305 1845 4002 1885
